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Introduction 
 
The advancement of sociology walks on two feet: the theoretical and the 
empirical research. In the case of sociology of human rights, the disconection between 
this two branches may be the reason which could explain why this science is not yet 
firmly established. It is paid more attention to the theoretical field in Europe. In Richard 
P. Claude’s words, “Comparative literature on the politico-legal history of righs and 
liberties is neither extensive nor systematic. French, German, British and Scandinavian 
scholars have shown a greater willingness than have Americans to generalize about 
staged development of rights and liberties and to scan lengthy historical 
periods”(CLAUDE: 1976, 6). On the other hand, the empirical research (and 
particularly the statistical research) has been developed mainly in the United States. But 
there´s a lack of conection between them. The theoretical branch is somehow captive to 
the grand theory programm, and so it is not still sufficiently qualified for linking its 
description of the human rights evolution to the other big trends of social change: 
urbanization, capitalist economy development, nation-state model widening in politics, 
population schooling, and so on. The sociological theory should answer the question: 
what are the social prerequisites for the efficiency of legal norms protecting human 
rights? Once we can give a proper answer to this question, then the sociological theory 
could apply its general model to the concrete analysis of the situation in a particular 
country. 
 
At the same time, the empirical research on human rights has been criticized by 
an important number of autors (Scarritt, McCamant, Barsh, Scoble, Wiseberg, Safran 
and Bollen, among others) for its inconsistent conceptualisation of human rights. One 
could say that they begin to measure before they decide what are they measuring. 
Notwithstanding that, there is a lot of profitable work made in the field of statistical 
research of human rights, and good examples of combination between empirical and 
theoretical research. If the social theory of human rifghts provides the general model, 
then the empirical research can be useful not only to verify that model, but also to 
design a methodology of assessment of the situation of human rights in different 
countries. In my opinion, the goal should be an indicators system of human rights. 
 
The aim of this paper is, following the work of Richard P Claude, to propose the 
basic lines of a model of concepualisation valid for both the empirical and the 
theoretical research on human rights. This model is based essentialy on the weberian 
work, and defines human rights for socio-legal research purposes as the typical 
pretensions of legitimacy used by states with a rationalizated law. Although this is 
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basically a weberian model, it is formulated in an open dialogue with other 
contributions (Norbert Elias, Niklas Luhmann, GH Mead, etc). This model of 
conceptualisation of human rights is not a closed one. It rather tries to suggest some 
lines for the development of a research programm. 
 
 
1. The situation in the empirical research: the case of indicators of human righst 
 
 
 If we ask for the concrete social conditions that could favor a more effective 
respect for human rights, it looks obvious that these are questions that should be 
answered by sociology and, since we are talking about rights, by legal sociology. But 
we find, as Vincenzo Ferrari says, that "sociological studies with regard to the formation 
of human rights are still not numerous or systematic enough as required by the 
importance of the argument" (1989, 175). Also Zehra Arat recognizes that empirical 
research has barely begun to be addressed: "Even though democracy has been a popular 
subject for social scientists in general, and for political scientists in particular, the result 
has been mainly theoretic, emphasizing what should be a democratic system. Empirical 
research has been presented in the form of casuistic studies focused toward the 
democratic experience of individual countries. The number of systematic comparative 
studies of democratic systems has been poor, and the ones that exist are limited in their 
objectives"(1991, 2). 
 
A remarkable effort to compare in a systematic way the situation of human 
rights is that of using indicators. This is not the place to perform a complete review of 
all human rights indicators, nor would it be necessary in order to show the importance 
of this point2. I will limit myself, on the contrary, to revising the indicator of Charles 
Humana, usually considered among the most refined. 
 
Humana published his "World Human Rights Guide” in 1983, 1986 and 1991. 
Along these years, Humana progressively modified his methodology to overcome the 
defects pointed out by his critics. His final criterion has been to adhere as much as 
possible to international human rights norms, so that what is evaluated looks 
unquestionable, because it is a direct application of the same normatively established 
human rights. This way, he tries to avoid the wide criticism adressed to some other 
human rights indicators, specially the annual report of Freedom House. One can see, 
however, that this is not the case, and that there are still methodological decisions 
whose foundation is not discussed. For example, of the 40 sections that compose his 
questionnaire, 7 refer to freedom of the press or communications (17.5% on the total), 
while only 3 refer to the right to work and union rights, that is, less than half. Why is so 
relevant the information on freedom of information, press, and communications for the 
assessment of human rights? There should be some reason explaining it, but Humana 
does not discuss this point. Let us see in detail his methodology. 
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 Some good reviews of the human rights indicators developed to the date, among others, are: Green, 
Maria Green “What we talk about when we talk about indicators: current approaches to human rights 
measurement”, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, pp. 1062-1097, 2001, or by Landmann T. and 
Häusermann, J. Map-Making and Analysis of the Main International Initiatives on Developing Indicators 
on Democracy and Good Governance. 2003. In spanish, there is also a review of the human rights 
indicators in my book Sociología de los derechos humanos (Aymerich, 2001). 
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Humana builds up a questionnaire with forty items, each one designed by an 
abbreviation. Immediately after this abbreviation the content of the concrete issue is 
mentioned, and below the article of the Declarations or International Pacts under which 
this issue falls. Each of these forty elements is examined in the states under scrutiny, 
and in relation to the situation, it is assigned a value in a table from 1 to 4, so that, for 
example, concerning LEGFEM the state where there is no discrimination whatsoever 
toward women and there exists an absolute legal and political equality would receive 
four points in this box. The scores obtained are added up in order to obtain the 
corresponding total score. Nevertheless, Humana considers that, if we strictly link the 
questionnaire to international legal texts, there is very little margin for a purposely 
biased interpretation, but each of the forty resulting elements cannot be assigned the 
same value, some of which are clearly more important that others in order to assess the 
situation of a state with regard to its respect for human rights. Thus, Humana selects 
seven of the forty elements and attributes them a special value. These seven elements 
are: TORMENT, PUNISH, CAPPUN, MURDER, DETENTN, FREEWORK and 
SLAVLABR. Humana assigns them a relative value three times larger than the rest of 
elements in the questionnaire, which in his opinion did not misrepresent the end results 
beyond 3-4%, nor did it critically alter the final ranking of countries. 
 
This methodology has been reviewed by Gupta, Jongman, and Schmid to 
enhance technically the Humana's methodology. First of all, they agree with Humana in 
linking every quantitative study to the letter of international human rights treaties 
(GUPTA, JONGMAN and SCHMID. 1994, 136). However, they do not justify this 
methodological decision, which is crucial, with any arguments. They observe that 
Humana formulates a questionnaire of 40 variables, taken directly from the international 
human rights standards, but he does not propose clear criteria for consideration between 
each of these 40 variables, which cannot be attributed identical importance. The 
Humana's decision to assign a triple value to some elements that are considered most 
important is arbitrary, and has not been sufficiently justified.  
 
For them, the root of the problem resides in the fact that every a priori function 
of quantitative criteria for consideration is vulnerable. In order to avoid this problem, 
they use discriminatory analysis, a statistical technique that would make it possible to 
find an objective criterion for consideration, used when the extremes of a scale are well 
defined, but not so every stretch that makes up the scale. The location in a given 
position of the scale depends on a set n of variables, and it is easy to verify that the 
maximization of all the variables results in the highest position in the scale, or the 
lowest position if we assign minimum values to the variables. The problem occurs when 
the magnitudes of the variables are intermediate, because one can assume in a reliable 
manner that not all will have identical importance. What is not known then is what 
relative weight each one of these variables has in the result, and accordingly it cannot be 
clearly defined who should be located in the middle position in the scale. The 
multivariate discriminatory analysis identifies those factors that have a greater weight in 
the determination of the position within a given scale, and accordingly it makes it 
possible to create a more objective end result. 
 
The authors classified the states in three groups: high, middle and low level of 
respect for human rights. A discriminatory analysis was then applied in which the 
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variables to consider were the 40 elements that compose Humana’s questionnaire, thus 
obtaining the relative weight that each of them had in the determination of the high, 
middle, or low position of the scale established beforehand. In the resulting table, some 
items show a high score (MURDER = 0,43727, DETENTN = 0,40548 or TORTURE = 
0,39029) while in the lowest part of the table some items are very close to cero 
(BRTHCONT = 0,03122 and MEMBER = 0,08037). As the authors point out, the first 
of the elements has a relative weight fourteen times higher than the last, and accordingly 
the assignment by Humana of a triple value for some elements turns out to be 
insufficient. Similarly, Humana had selected seven priority elements to which he 
assigned this triple value but, out of them, only three have been shown as significantly 
more determinant (MURDER, DETENTN and TORTURE), while the other four fall to 
positions 18 (CAPPUN), 23 (SLAVLABR), 31 (FREEWORK) and 35 (PUNISH). It is 
thus emphasized how mere personal estimates can be an unreliable basis when 
establishing the definition, precision, validity and equivalence in statistical 
methodology. 
 
The contribution of Gupta, Jongman, and Schmid represents an advance in 
certain aspects, but it poses new difficulties. Linking each element of their questionnaire 
with articles of the Declaration or of the international Pacts does not imply a linear 
correspondence between the two. As we already saw, Humana selects 7 elements which 
are very directly related (PAPER, BOOK, TVRADIO, FREEINFO, FREEPRESS, 
MONITOR and FREEART) all derivatives of article 19 of the universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Granting 7 elements of a total of 40 to a single article is a criterion for 
definition that would deserve a good theory to back it up, something which Humana has 
not done. But applying the statistical criterion of Gupta, Jongman, and Schmid it is 
verified that all these elements have a very next relative weight among themselves 
(except for FREEART, which is already a debatable indicator in a questionnaire of 40 
items, they are all within a margin of 0,033 points up or down above an average of 
0.26158 in the coefficient). It can be logically deduced that it is not necessary to 
multiply by seven the elements related to article 19 of the Declaration when the results 
obtained in each do not differ substantially concerning the others. If, on the contrary, 
they remained in that proportion, we now know that the indicator would modify 
upwards the score of those states in which article 19 of the universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was respected. In the opposite direction, those elements that more have 
been demonstrated to be more determinant should be accentuated by means of 
separating them in new more specific elements. 
 
Thus, discriminatory analysis can help demonstrate that the relative 
consideration of each element should be adjusted, but also it can help verify that the 
composition of the questionnaire was disproportionate. The most clear solution aims at 
the review of the initial conceptualization, establishing new elements, which should be 
successively tested. Now then, whenever elements with little relevance are identified, 
which had originally been assigned some explanatory value, it will be necessary to 
question the arguments that justified the initial model. And similarly, every new attempt 
of conceptualization will need to argue why some elements are selected and not others. 
Otherwise, it would be necessary to consider all the elements imaginable in order to 
compose the questionnaire, and the test of discriminatory analysis would become an 
unending circle of trial and error. This leads us once again to the same conclusion: the 
use of solid quantitative techniques is not enough without the definition of a previous 
hypothesis we are trying to prove and that justifies why a certain methodology or 
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another is adopted. This is an aspect of research that, as is the case with other authors, 
also Gupta, Jongman, and Schmid avoid. Neither they nor Humana justify, for example, 
why there is no element related to the right to social security (article 22 of the universal 
Declaration and article 9 of the international Pact of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights); this absence in practice grants priority to the position of states with models of 
economic development not backed by the social protection of the workers, since the 
breach of this article is not computed when evaluating the status of the state in question. 
On the other hand, an element is included regarding the right to interdenominational or 
interracial marriage, which results in lower positions for countries of Islamic tradition, 
where the marriage of Moslem women is prohibited with a man from another religion. 
These types of options do not depend on techniques of discriminatory analysis, but on 
another type of reasons that should not left be unanswered. 
 
 
 
2. What do human rights indicators measure? 
 
 
It is possible to build different kinds of indicators according to their target. 
Malhotra and Fasel (2006, 1) divide them in a) events-based data on human rights 
violations, b) socio-economic and other administrative statistics, c) household 
perception and opinion surveys and d) initiatives using data based on expert 
judgements. Landmann (2004, 911) considers three types: a) rights in principle, b) 
rights in practice and c) government policies and outcomes. In my oppinion, the first 
question to be answered if we want to measure human rights employing indicators is the 
target itself: do we measure norms, facts or social change trends? The answer given to 
this question is the first step to take in the definition tasks. Let us consider this three 
posibilities. 
 
If the target is to measure norms, then our attempt is to measure and compare the 
legal system of each country. Normative systems do not describe facts, but rather how 
the world should be. Accordingly, they cannot be evaluated directly in factual terms, 
since it is impossible to find facts in an ideal entity. The question of the degree of 
respect for rights or compliance with legal instruments is basically resolved in the 
judicial arena, because the judges’ work consists precisely in deciding what is the 
correspondence between facts and norms. But judges do not examine facts making use 
of the methodology of the social sciences; they use a method that is also normatively 
determined. Indeed, the law does not only establish how individuals, authorities, and 
organizations should act, but it also includes rules on the procedure that a judge should 
follow in order to select what facts are relevant and which should be ignored, or what 
facts the litigant parties can allege, or what order of priority the facts have among 
themselves. Using as a basis the judicial decisions, it is indeed possible to carry out 
factual assessments of the norms, in the form of statistics concerning the number of 
claims or how judges finally resolve them. But in this case it is necessary to take into 
account two conditioning factors: first, in this case statistics do not measure the norms, 
but the judicial decisions. Second, that the methodology we use has a mixed nature. On 
the one hand, the quantitative analysis is carried out using statistical techniques, but 
there must previously exist a judicial decision that requires a legal methodology. Taking 
into account these conditions, the factual analysis of the normative systems is indeed 
possible. 
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This is not the case, however, with international standards on human rights, of 
which only a small part has an effective international judicial guardianship. Only 105 
countries, for instante, joined the treaty which stablished the Internacional Criminal 
Court. Accordingly, a unified and effectively universal administration of justice is still 
lacking, one that applies the standards with a systematic set of compatible criteria, and 
whose resolutions can be examined quantitatively. And this deficiency also prevents 
that the tie be forged in a reliable manner between facts and norms. Let us imply, for 
example, that a given individual is a member of a clan, or even a Mafia organization, 
that guarantees him sufficient protection of his life and physical integrity. Let us 
consider along with him the citizen of a democracy whose constitution guarantees him 
the fundamental rights to life and to physical integrity. It cannot be said, however, that 
these are two cases of application of article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Although we can confirm the fact that the two people enjoy personal safety, it is 
the normative type of referent from which the facts acquire their meaning that makes it 
possible to differentiate these situations. Only in the second case there is a relationship 
between the fact and the norm, and this relation is verifiable because there exists an 
administration of justice instituted in order to guarantee that the facts match the 
standard. 
 
This is why the aforementioned weberian model is important. We have to keep 
in mind that our definition of human rights should be subjected to empirical scrutiny 
and, at the same time, it should be a consistent model of the processes of 
implementation of human rights in different places during the past two centuries. If we 
define human rights as one of the typical pretensions of legitimacy that states can use to 
present themselves as legitimate authorities in front of their cititzens, then we are 
dealing both with the normative and the factual side of the question. Because the Mafia 
do not pretend to rule by means of the recognition of equal universal rights granted by 
independent judges and courts. On the other hand, the assesment of states that grant the 
right to life and phisical integrity by constitutional provisions can be made by the way 
in which such provisions are in acordance with the international norms on human rights 
(and obviously this is not the case for the Mafia) and by the facts showing how many 
violations of these rights take place within the borders of that state. So we cannot 
resolve the problem by dividing human rights indicators in “rights in principle” and 
“rights in practice”, as Landmann does (see above) because this way we leave 
unanswered the question of the kind of link between facts and norms. 
 
The absence of a judicial system with the necessary competence and ability to 
enforce the international standards on human rights means that the effectiveness of most 
of them depends on the states’ adaptation of their internal legal framework to the 
provisions in the Declaration of 1948 and to the International Pacts of 1966, as well as 
in other sectoral conventions (against genocide, of 1948; against racial discrimination, 
of 1965, etc.). If this adaptation truly existed, then there would be another way of 
proving the effectiveness of human rights, using to this end the internal judicial 
resolutions of every state. But this way is only possible if the internal standards of all 
the states and the international standards have full correspondence, which to the naked 
eye looks difficult if we consider the fact that each constitution follows its own system 
of recognition of rights.  
 
 7 
It is necessary to change our point of view. The information as to whether some 
given facts constitute a violation of a right can only be established by the competent 
court, and leads to legally established sanctions. When we abandon the context of the 
judicial decisions, the information on human rights is already of another nature and it 
leads to a different type of results. As McCamant recalls, "it is one thing to request a 
government to help prepare a legal cause against people responsible for violations of 
human rights, and a very different one to seek non-judicial policies of sanction toward 
foreign governments. The localized use of foreign aid, the rupture of diplomatic 
relations or trade or investment embargoes demand global evaluations of the 
governments and the countries" (McCamant. 1981, 123). It is no possible to replace the 
lack of international human rights courts with effective authority, and most of all, the 
sociological research on human rights cannot provide a substitute for that. But, on the 
other hand, it can sometimes help for other kind of goals. This is the case, for instance, 
in the development aid programms. “In the space of just a few years, human rights 
policies have thus acquired a central place in the international development cooperation 
debate” (Advisory Council on International Affairs (ACIA): 2003, 22). The ACIA 
report reviews the way in which diferent institutions in the international community are 
changing to a human rights based approach to development: the UN, UNICEF, the ILO, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, the german, 
british and swedish experience with development aid, and so on.  
 
The most relevant initiatives are; concerning the UN, the Human Development 
Report 2000 was devoted to the human rights based approach to development, and as a 
consecuence of the increasing interest of the UN in closing the link between 
development and human rights, de UNDP established the Human Rights Strengthening 
(HURIST). The European Union has a long experience in the human rights based 
approach to development: in the frame of the Lomé Conventions (1975-2000) and the 
Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020). Every cooperation agreement of the EU contains 
human rights provisions. The Foreign Office of the Netherlands has publicized its 
commitment to make its assistance development program conditional on the absence of 
violations of human rights in the recipient countries, as documented by the reports of 
Amnesty International (Baehr, 1982, 39-52). In the United States sections 116 (d) and 
502 (b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 prohibit the foreign aid to countries 
involved in a consistent pattern of serious violations of internationally recognized 
human rights. To this end, since 1976 the State Department sends Congress a report 
entitled Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, that should condition the 
destination of development assistance funds. Also, the United States organization 
Freedom House publishes annually a report on the situation of the civil and political 
rights in the world that also intends to influence the assignment of foreign aid, as 
recognized in the 1994-95report: “Fragile and emerging democracies deserve to be the 
focus of the United States foreign aid” (Karatnycky. 1995, 8) 3. Norway, Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, and Canada , in a similar way, have also decided to grant their 
foreign aid following independent reports, like "Human rights in developing countries"4, 
an annual publication that analyzes the situation of human rights and the social 
                                                 
3
 Freedom House has been characterized by some critics as a bastion of the United States conservative 
thinking. Cfr., for example,NAGLE, John D. Introduction to comparative politics. Nelson Hall. Chicago, 
1985. p. 95.  
4
 VV. AA. Human Rights in Developing Countries. Yearbook 1994. Nordic Human Rights Publications. 
Oslo, 1994. The reference is from the year 1994 but the publication is annual. 
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conditions and policies of various developing states, candidates for receiving that 
foreign aid. 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht added a new title on development cooperation that 
includes the promotion of human rights between its main goals. And finally, the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) supports the 
strengthening of human rights by way of cooperation with NGOs and international 
organisations. “Under preassure from the expanding role of human rights in the EU 
development cooperation and the ever-increasing demand for results, the European 
Union has acknowledged the importance of developing indicators that meassure the 
effectiveness of its development policies more accurately. The Commission recently 
introduced a number of initiatives for this purpose, largely on the basis of the Millenium 
Development Goals. In this regard, however, it should be noted that the existing range 
of tools that are essential for implementing and supporting an effective human rights 
policy (e.g. tools for collecting and analysing data and increasing the human rights 
expertise of relevant staff) is still inadequate”. (Advisory Council on International 
Affairs: 2003, 30) 
 
The possible diversity of criteria in the overall analysis of the situation lead 
MacCamant to question even that compliance with human rights can be evaluated. This 
analysis should be based on another form of conceptualization of such situations that 
differentiates them from the imputability that refers to individuals. Thus he proposes a 
substantial change: abandon human rights as direct referent and move to analytically 
different concepts. This implies, among other things, a causal theory on the 
effectiveness of the standards related to human rights, in addition to a conceptual 
redefinition of the object of this type of general reports on the situation. In this regard, 
McCamant proposes six types of facts to investigate: 
 
1. Equality of economic and social condition 
2. Provision of minimum economic and social conditions 
3. Respect for cultural diversity 
4. Self-determination of the groups 
5. Political participation 
6. Freedom and political repression 
 
These general concepts must be disaggregated into more specific elements, but 
according to McCamant’s thinking, they cover the majority of the phenomena included 
in the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the International 
Pacts of 1966. In this case, these are no longer standards that public authorities should 
meet, but social objectives that they should maximize. This takes us from the general 
description of the situation of human rights by states to another type of report: the 
indicators. If we follow McCamant’s oppinion, then we have reached the second 
possibility, that of considering human rights as facts. As I’ll try to show further, this 
way of conceptualization of rights doesn’t pay attention to what does it mean to follow a 
rule and, consecuently, to the difference between natural facts and normative evaluation 
of facts. 
 
The third posibility is to measure social change trends, or social processes of 
implementation of human rights. This is only possible if we can translate human rights 
into a measurable process (which is the aim of indicators) and compare it with other 
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patterns of social change already available in the quantitative social and economic 
research. Tomasevski suggest “a departure from the conventional views on measuring 
the realization of human rights, specifically from attempts to quantify violations. It 
proposes a different approach: to focus on government obligations rather than individual 
rights. Monitoring necessitates a conceptual framework to define what to monitor 
before one can proceed to discuss how and proceed to the design of indicators. In order 
to develop such a framework human rights obligations ought to be operationalized to 
make them applicable in development. Development is used here to denote those 
economic and social policies which intergovernmental development finance agencies 
and individual governments are pursuing in practice, thus not in a sense of what 
development should be but what it is. Because development will not often appear 
conducive to the promotion and protection of human rights, human rights ought to be 
“translated” into development policies, programmes and projects” (1993, 1) 
 
But this definition of a general evolutionary table of human rights, quantifiable through 
indicators is still a pending task. As López and Stohl recognize, despite a certain 
experience of years "it is embarrassing although necessary to admit that relatively 
limited concrete progress has been made both in the improvement of the transnational 
discussion and between the various ideologies on human rights and also in the 
establishment of the relationships between human rights and specific corporate, 
economic and political processes and structures" (1992, 217). But once we can build a 
reliable indicator of human rights, then we could analize the correlation it shows with 
some other social indicator: urbanization, illiteracy, economic growth, and so on.  
 
Among the different main proceses of social change, the researchers attention is paid 
mostly to the correlation between human rights and development. Zehra Arat, for 
instance, made an important contribution by showing the correlation between human 
rights and equitative development. Her argument is that it’s no possible to disconect 
civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. The proof is the 
statistical correlation between the increase of income inequality and the increasing 
episodes of violation of civil and political rights (Arat, 1991). Pritchard points out a 
more precise conection between human rights and economic development: 
“Substantively, the analysis indicates that performance on human rights conditions is 
associated with national government revenue to a greater degree than gross economic 
resources. This applies particularly to socio-economic rigths, but is also true in the case 
of political and, to a lesser extent, civil rights” (Pritchard: 1987, 17). 
 
Sometimes the relationship between development and human rights follows the simplest 
hypothesis, whereby both always evolve jointly. The World Bank has defended this 
hypothesis in some of its annual reports5, and was criticized for the inconsent data 
offered to show that correlation. If such hypothesis were correct, one would easily reach 
the utilitarian conclusion that human rights deserve respect because doing so is 
economically advantageous. The relationship between development and human rights 
deserves a closer look. Thus, Barsh considers that the Declaration of the right to 
                                                 
5
 The World Development Report of 1991 contained a matrix of statistical correlations based on the 
report of Freedom House. This matrix attempted to demonstrate the causal relation between public 
freedoms and economic growth.  
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development of 1986 has defined this right as the achievement of human rights, the 
increase of human capabilities and individual choices. “In accordance with this 
emerging vision, human rights, and development are, by definition, the same thing” 
(Barsh. 1993, 115). This premise invites a reconsideration of the research goal: it should 
no longer aim to demonstrate that human rights favor economic development or vice 
versa, since this hypothesis has become tautological. Even though Fukuda-Parr still 
points out the difference between human rights and human development, and so the 
difference in their respective indicators (Fukuda-Parr. 2001, 240). The issue is now to 
determine the nature of the relationship between growth (understood as the mere 
increase in the gross national product) and development (which already includes the full 
enjoyment of human rights). Once the interdependence of this relation is known, public 
policies can maximize the benefits of development for humans. Research should focus 
on two independent types of data: those which identify the instances of repression, and 
those which increase the benefits of development for humans. For the former, there is 
no need to classify all the States of the world, a usual procedure that Barsh proposes to 
abandon. And for the latter, the methodology implies disaggregating human rights in 
relation to their role in human development. That is, instead of their unitary 
consideration as a normative body, classified internally in civil, political, and economic 
rights, they should be understood in relation to their cooperation to development, and 
hence Barsh proposes to reclassify them into human resources (literacy rates, health 
status indicators, etc.), personal safety (freefom from interference in private life, 
property, etc.) and power (both its exercise –participation, pluralism- and the conditions 
for its effective exercise –free press and opinion-). 
 
Both Barsh and McCamant shift the point of view from norms to facts, as we 
see. But the question remains the same. Why this particular set of facts are the direct 
translation of the human rights norms to the factual field? To show the correspondance 
between facts and norms we still need a general model of development of human rights. 
 
If one can attempt a definition of human rights in which these are conceived in 
the same dimension as development, the same is worth attempting with respect to some 
other main trends of social change. Among them, I find particularly interesting the link 
between human rights and governance. In order to show how direct the relationship is 
between the two concepts, I am going to follow the argumentation of John Boli-Bennett, 
who basically tries to show the falsehood of the habitual concept of human rights as 
limits upon the power of the state. In order to test his hypothesis, Boli-Bennett analyzed 
all the Constitutions in the world between 1870 and 1970, and synthesized the rights 
recognized in them in a list that includes 42 different types of rights, divided into four 
groups: civil, procedural, political, and socioeconomic. Each concrete concept is 
assigned a criterion for ordinal quantification with two or three levels.  
 
The section of civil rights includes the right to peaceful gathering (with three 
possibilities: nonexistent, only for unarmed people, and unrestricted), the freedom of 
association (nonexistent, in general, and including the specific right to create political 
parties, unions, etc.), the freedom of conscience (nonexistent, in general, and including 
objection to military service), and so on. Procedural, political and socioeconomic laws 
are also defined in the classical terms of the Declaration of 1948 or of the International 
Pacts of 1966, which means that it is not necessary to reproduce the complete list. The 
other three codings are more innovative. In the first, Boli-Bennett brought together the 
duties of citizens usually included in the Constitutions under study, which he 
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synthesized in the following 10 sections: obligation to breed and educate one’s children, 
to participate in the defense of the nation, to be educated (obligatory schooling), to carry 
an identity document, loyalty to the state, citizen participation, payment of taxes, respect 
for public property, respect for other people, and work. 
 
In the following list, the author included the areas of social life in which the 
Constitutions explicitly attributed jurisdiction to the state and it contains 56 elements 
that represent the areas of expansion of public bureaucratic domination: agriculture, 
savings, storage and goods, arts and handcrafts, associations, banking and credit, 
professional training, natural catastrophes, game and fishing, cemeteries, sciences, 
colonies, foreign trade, labor disputes, etc. The last table includes the state’s 
mechanisms to increase its capacity of control over social relations, made up of 45 
elements. It includes a classical repertory of the competences of the various state 
authorities, such as the preparation of the budget, the concession of pardons and 
amnesties, legislation, police, control of the dominant economic positions, concession 
of extraditions, nationalizations, , etc. The results that each state obtains in relation to 
the variables of civil, procedural, political and socioeconomic rights are added up in 
order to obtain what Boli-Bennett calls the “index of rights of the citizens”. He calls the 
results of the list of constitutionally established duties “index of duties of the citizens”. 
And the summary of the results of the last two tables, that of social areas put under 
guardianship of the state and that of mechanisms of increase in state control are added 
in the “index of state jurisdiction”. Based on this elaboration, Boli-Bennett begins his 
analysis of the variations that have been taking place in the last century in sequences of 
intervals of 20 years. The result obtained is summarized in the following table: 
 
 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 
IRC 16,5 17,0 17,3 19,8 24,6 27,9 
IDC 1,4 1,92 2,07 2,31 3,92 3,82 
ISJ 25,6 26,7 29,1 35,8 46,2 49,4 
 
IRC expresses the index of rights of the citizen, IDC the index of duties and ISJ 
the index of state jurisdiction. The numerical values express the total of the average 
values of each right or competencies included in the corresponding index. The variable 
with the proportionately higher increase, as shown, is that of the duties of the citizens 
(172%), although its total value is limited (seven and thirteen times less than the value 
of the other two). The index of state jurisdiction increases 93% during the century, and 
the index of rights increases 69%. Not only is there a very similar increase between 
these two variables, but the increase rate is also parallel. Thus, if the index of rights is 
separated into civil, political, and socioeconomic rights, the results deserve attention. 
The last one of the three increased 338%, while civil rights increased 43% and political 
rights 127%. As Boli-Bennett points out when commenting on these data, "the type of 
rights that more clearly protects  individuals from the state is the one that increased the 
least, while the type that more clearly incorporates individuals in state programs is that 
with greater expansion" (Boli-Bennett. 1981, 179). 
 
The conclusion that Boli-Bennett reaches is that the constitutional rights of the 
citizens are more widely recognized wherever the state authority is expanded in order to 
include individuals in its programms of action, and in tandem there exists a tendency to 
define the rights as alienable or subject to restrictions by the state. "The ideology of the 
rights of the citizens helps the states to expand their legitimacy in society and to 
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implicate the citizens in state programs, tending to replace a form of subordination of 
the individual (coercions and traditional habits) with another (control by the state)" 
(Boli-Bennett. 1981, 182)..Starting in the 1930s, when an expansion of the capacity for 
control of the state occurred throughout the world, the recognition of the social rights 
was also generalized. And, in more general terms, it is no accident that the greatest 
expansion of the ideology of human rights has occurred in the period of history in which 
the power of the state has increased faster everywhere. Pritchard, in a very similar way, 
concludes her own research saying: “it is appropriate to specify why nations with 
greater government resources (revenue) are expected to reflect better human rights 
conditions. The nature of the state’s command over resources is sufficient to make it a 
formidable force in shaping human rights conditions, and the extent to which the state 
can effectively raise human rights conditions depends on it’s resource capacity. But why 
expect a positive effect? Theory from the field of public administration sugests that the 
state, through the behavior of bureaucracies, will seek the common interest through the 
rational logic of the technician” (Pritchard: 1987, 12). The research conclusions of Boli-
Bennett and Pritchard is that human rights and governance can be conceived as 
elements of a single dimension. And, following the Barsh's proposal, they could also be 
synthesized with development. Both examples show properly the way of researching 
human rights as social change processes, with its correlation to other trends in social 
change. 
 
 
3. Definition problems in human rights indicators 
 
 
The systems of indicators respond to the purpose of quantifying concepts that, 
by themselves, either are not directly quantifiable, or else they are even impossible to 
observe. Clearly, democracy  or equality cannot be "measured". The task is, then, to 
locate the best indicator for the concept that one wants to evaluate. This is, for example, 
what McCamant does when he translates human rights into the set of aforementioned 
variables. But the relationship between the indicator and the concept cannot be 
obviated, and in order to prove that an indicator is a good sign of a concept, we need a 
theory that explains the reason for this relation. As Barsh points out, "the relationship 
between the measurement or indicator and the characteristic or variable to measure 
should be itself based on a theory, which should be tested regardless of the hypothesis 
that has been designed to assist in its verification. On the contrary, the publications of 
the social sciences abound in arbitrariness, common opinions or a priori rules of 
correspondence, that should be suspicious as systematically biased or etnocentric" 
(1993, 96). Indeed, the criticisms of etnocentrism have not been infrequent. Scoble and 
Wiseberg (1981, 148), for example, show that in the research made in the United States, 
the individual civil and political rights are concretely defined, are numerous, and have 
the highest priority. The economic, social, and cultural rights are rather vague, defined 
generically, and appear in a negative context: they should not condition or compromise 
the civil and political rights. Socioeconomic rights usually receive a much greater 
emphasis on the definitions employed by european investigators. Accepting an 
indiscriminately an etnocentric definition as universal by the investigator could lead to 
an outcome of research inevitably linked to cultural prejudices. William Safran also 
insists that "the American investigators are inclined to see the system of civil liberties of 
the United States as a model" (1981, 195). If we are unaware of it or do it inadequately, 
later work will be vitiated. Following Kuhn, who has had such an impact in the 
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methodology of the social sciences, herein lies the reason why measurements taken 
without a paradigm lead so rarely to a definitive conclusion (Kuhn. 1987, 210).  
 
Devising a system of indicators that could conceptualize human rights in a 
univocal sense above the cultural diversity that underlies the world's Constitutions 
requires a good theory. Without an explicit mention to the theoretical assumptions that 
underlie the formalization of the indicators, the validity of these systems results in a 
petition of principle. All appearance of rigor based on the mere utilization of statistical 
techniques vanishes at this point. Let us consider, for example, the problems posed by 
aggregation. Any system of indicators brings together a large amount of information, 
for the purpose of synthesizing from it a more limited set of relevant data. But, how 
does one synthesize the total set of the information? Can heterogeneous factors mix in a 
quantitative indicator? This is also an issue that requires a theoretical foundation which 
justifies that aggregation measures parameters that can be signs of a single reality. Thus, 
human right standards include such heterogeneous realities as the right to political 
participation and the right to paid vacations. How can both things be added in an 
aggregate indicator? This is only possible if the figure resulting from the aggregation 
operations is the expression of a single reality, beyond the diversity of issues included 
in human right standards. And then it is necessary to conceptualize human rights in a 
single category. Otherwise, this would be a never-ending discussion about the technical 
disputes over the relative weight of each element that should be synthesized in the 
aggregate, as shown by the criticism of Gupta, Jongman, and Schmid to Humana's 
indicator. In other words, it is necessary to conceptualize the progress in human rights 
as a progress in a single direction, not as the total of many independent development 
processes. 
 
Along these lines, James R. Scarritt (1981, 115-23), after analyzing the current 
situation of human rights indicators, concludes that the models available so far are 
incomplete and suffer from conceptual or methodological weaknesses. Accordingly, he 
proposes a different model, one that is based on a synthesis of Flathman’s and Claude’s  
contributions. Scarritt tries to classify human rights by way of a combination of the 
analytical and the historical dimension. The horizontal axis contains the generations of 
rights, while the vertical column divides human rights into basic categories: positive and 
negative laws. Positive laws include, for instance, the right to health care, housing, 
work, etc. Negative laws include rights against the state and against groups or private 
individuals. Accordingly, human rights should be analyzed from the perspective of the 
historical trends of social change, and particularly political change. One can conclude, 
logically, that before using a system of indicators constructed by aggregation, we should 
use a system that handles information on events which can be singled-out, serializing 
them in order to detect patterns of change. Therefore, such system would deal with the 
measurement and explanation of general political change. Such political change would 
be defined with sufficient amplitude as to encompass changes in political roles, group 
structures and standards, including the content and pattern of development of public 
policies. And especially we should take into account the proposal that suggests the 
replacement of systems based on the aggregation of multiple variables into a single final 
indicator with a historical development scheme in accordance with variables previously 
classified in a general evolution scheme. In such evolutionary scheme, the dominant 
issue is the relation that exists between the processes of change directly related to 
human rights and other processes of social and political change, which are basically the 
development and the changes in the systems of organization of power. 
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4. The conceptualization of human rights in empirical and theoretical research 
 
 
 After reviewing the situation of empirical research on human rights we can 
conclude that its main problem is the lack of a theoretical conceptualization of rights. 
The first step is to define the social conditions for the effectiveness of human rights, and 
show them in the form of a tipical process of social change. As I said before, we need to 
shift our point of view from the legal way of thinking about rights to the sociological 
way of describing patterns of social change. And it is not possible to take the socio-legal 
concept of human rights directly from the normative level, as Humana, Gupta, Jongman 
and Schmid do, because norms are not facts, and thus this conceptualization of rights 
could not be subjected to empirical verification. My proposal, following Weber, is to 
make use of the sociological concept of typical pretension of legitimacy.  
 
 Legitimacy, in the sociological meaning defined by Weber, is the possibility of 
one commandment to be obeyed. It is not a theory of justice or something like that; it is 
a verifiable concept. It takes place when legal obligations are honored, but also when a 
fireman cries: “get out, the house is burning!” and the people gets out. The fireman 
pretends to be obeyed on the basis that he is the competent authority in that kind of 
situations, and we can confirm that this pretension of legitimacy is effective by 
observing wether the people gets out from the burning house or not. It’s clear enough 
that the same people who obeys the fireman after his warning wouldn’t do so if his 
commandment would have been a medical, artistic, religious or economic one, because 
he is not a doctor, nor a priest, nor an economist, but a fireman. So the possibility of one 
commandment to be obeyd is not mainly related to the personality of the one pretending 
obedience, but to the reason argued to ask for obedience. If someone pretends my 
obedience because of some legally stablished obligations, we can also confirm 
empirically the effectiveness of such a pretension. From my point of view, this way of 
sociological conceptualization of rights is particularly usefull, as it links the normative 
meaning of rights with its factual counterpart. Some political systems pretend to be 
legitimate on the basis of religious reasons. For instance, “Government in Saudi Arabia 
derives power from the Holy Koran and the Prophet's tradition” (article 7 of the Saudi 
Constitution). Other countries link their legitimacy to the constitutional provision of a 
set of fundamental rights defined in accordance to the international human rights. And 
the pharaos or the japan emperors pretended legitimacy (and were obeyed) because of 
their divine nature. Legitimacy, in this precise meaning, takes into account both norms 
(the commandment, the pretensions of legitimacy) and facts (the people obeying the 
commandment or not).  
 
The well known Aristotle’s classification of political systems can be described as 
an answer to the question: who governs? Weber suggestion is to change that question 
for another one: why should the ruler be obeyed? Every exercise of power in history 
(not only the political authorities) has tried to be accepted according to different kinds 
of reasons. So we can classify them by the arguments they used to present themselves as 
legitimate. The classification made by Weber is widely recognized: there are traditional, 
charismatic and rational (legal) forms of legitimation (Weber: 1985, 124). Rational 
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legitimation is only possible for the state. Former ways of social organization, the clans 
systems, for instance, could pretend legitimacy by the guarantee of protection for their 
members (the same could be said for the Mafia, as I tried to show before in another 
example). But it cannot be said that this is the same kind of guarantee of rights provided 
by a democratic state. The discourse of legitimation in democracies is tied to the 
universality of human rights, but the clan discourse of legitimacy is is a form of 
traditional loyalty, valid only for the members of the clan.  
 
Another well known Weber’s thesis is that the sociological precondition for the 
origin of the state is the monopoly of legitimate violence (Weber: 1985, 518-19). The 
most accurate sociological description of the historic process of monopolization of 
legitimate violence has been made by Norbert Elias, who agrees with Weber in this 
point (Elias: 2000, 51). Considering that only states can guarantee human rights, and 
that states can only appear once the monopoly of legitimate violence is stablished, then 
this is also a precondition for human rights. The above reviewed conclusions of Gupta, 
Jongman and Schmid on the central role of the rights to life, phisical integrity, not to 
suffer torture, etc. could be seen as an empirical verification of this thesis. In my 
oppinion, and in agreement with the Barsh's proposal, this should be the first step for an 
indicator of human rights: to devise an indicator of personal safety. If the state has not 
succeeded in effectively pacifying the territory because there are ethnic, cultural, 
economic, or religious oppressed minorities, that is, excluded from the legitimacy 
discourse of the political system, then we have a sign of ineffectiveness in the respect 
for human rights, since the state does not offer guarantees of equality and respect for 
minorities. In order to gather statistical information related to this question it is 
necessary to mention the work of Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff and James Scarritt.  
 
The second step for the human rights indicator should pay attention to the typical 
pretensions of legitimacy on which the different political systems are based, which 
could be assesed by their correspondence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948, the 1966 UN covenants and the other main international standards. As 
Tomasevski points out, “The first issue requires an analysis of the explicit commitments 
to international human rights standards for each government in order to identify the 
degree to which it accepts universal human rigths standards. Explicit departures from 
universal standards (often encountered with regard to the human rights of women and of 
foreigners, the rights of the child, indigenous rights, minority rights, property rights) 
ought to be taken into account in the conceptualization of indicators” (Tomasevski; 
1993, 2). And she adds that it is not only important to consider the ratification of treaties 
but also the reservations made by states, which sometimes nullify the effectiveness of 
the norm. Kirby explicitly points to the First Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by which the parties accept the jurisdiction of 
the Human Rights Committee, and they accord to individual complainants a right of 
communication to the Committee. “This is why ratification of the First Optional 
Protocol can be seen as an important indicator of the implementation of human rights in 
a given country. In a sense, it is an indication of a state’s confidence in its general 
adherence to the Covenant’s human rights principles” (Kirby: 2003, 332). In my 
oppinion, this second point of the indicator should include: a) status of ratification of the 
international covenants on human rights, b) comparative analysis of the constitutions 
and main laws (criminal code, for instance) and c) outstanding judicial decisions on 
fundamental rights. 
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Coming back to Weber’s classification of the typical pretensions of legitimacy 
(traditional, charismatic and rational), and if we apply this scheme to the case of human 
rights, it fits within the rational (or legal) one, and Weber states that this occurs as a 
result of the process of rationalization of law. Claude shares this point of view: “For the 
progress of human rights development, the only determined point or necessary 
prerequisite is the existence of a secure legal system. There must be a juridical solution 
to the problem of social organization for the ambitious march toward human rights to 
commence”(Claude: 1976, 6). And Claude quotes Weber in support of the thesis of the 
secure legal system as a prerequisite for human rights (Claude: 1976, 7-10). 
 
 According to Kirby, the rule of law as a social condition for the effectiveness of 
human rights can be paired with an empirical indicator of it. “The mere existence of 
independent courts is just the prerequisite to the protection of human rights. Self-
evidently there must be, in adition, an indepedente legal profession which has the 
courage to bring difficult and unpopular cases to the courts. On of the most important 
annual publications for monitoring the indicators of the implementation of human rights 
is Attacks on Justice. This report is produced every year by the Centre for the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers (CIJL) in Geneva, established by the International 
Commission of Jurists. It chronicles the attacks, both physical and institutional, upon 
judges and lawyers in many lands” (Kirby: 2003, 335).  
 
 We have seen the role of the monopoly of legitimate violence and the 
rationalization of law as social conditions of human rights. But in the weberian model 
there is still another one: bureaucracy. Bureacratization, according to Weber, is not only 
a development process in the administration of public affairs, but also in the economic 
administration of private companies or even in the churchs administration. Weber 
shows the parallelism of the bureacracy’s strugle against the privileges of the 
aristocracy at the end of the ancien régime and the conflict between the virtuousness 
religiosity and the clerk’s administration. In the typical discourse of legitimacy of a 
bureaucratizated church we find the same universalism (everyone is called to be saved 
by God’s grace) that we find in the bureacratizated state (everyone is legally equal). 
Otherwise, salvation is only granted to those qualified by religious virtue, as in the 
political side the exercise of power is only accesible to those qualified by nobility 
(Weber: 1988, 260). There is a conection, thus, between bureacratization and equality as 
a typical pretension of legitimacy. The above mentioned conclusions of Boli-Bennett 
and Pritchard about the relation between state expansion and human rights are 
coincidental with this weberian thesis.  
 
Bureacratization is also important for economic development, as it leads to a more 
rational system of private administration and provision of goods and services. Weber 
don’t consider capitalist economy as a social precondition of human rights, but the 
process of economic development is closely linked to the rationalization of law and the 
bureaucratic administration of public affairs, so it can be integrated in a global model of 
development. This is the way it is considered by the World Bank: when firms must 
decide where are they going to invest, they need to consider the opportunities of the 
many possible locations. “Early efforts to understand how government influence these 
location-specific factors focused on broad indicators of country risk, often based on 
surveys of international experts and usually resulting in a single score for each country. 
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Many studies focused on the narrower question of the constraints facing foreign firms. 
The last 20 years have seen a broadening and deepening of efforts to understand how 
various location-specific factors influence differences in incomes across countries. 
Researchers began by looking at various aggregate indicators of a country’s institutional 
and policy environment, such as the rule of law, corruption, openness to trade, legal 
origins, and financial sector depth” (World Bank: 2005, 20-21). The regression analysis 
applied to foreign investment decisions by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi shows a 
strong correlation with “rule of law”, “government effectiveness”, “regulatory quality”, 
and “control of corruption”. The rule of law or the government effectiveness are not the 
same than human rights, but legal legitimation and bureacracy are their social 
preconditions, so this close conection with economic development is important to 
understand the whole frame of social change surrounding the evolution of human rights.  
I’ve already mentioned the oppinion of Tomasevski about the necessary integration of 
human rights with development policies.  
 
 Progress can be made in the sociological conceptualization of human rights 
along the same lines. This represents a narrowing of the normative concept of human 
rights in order to make it operative, but in return I think it will be possible to design a 
system of indicators that overcomes some of the problems of the systems attempted so 
far. 
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